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RESPONSE 
Southern Title Guaranty Company, Inc., herewith submits 
its response to the appellants' Petition for Rehearing. While 
Southern was not a party to the appeal, the appellants' Petition 
for Rehearing impacts directly upon the position of Southern 
as the insurer of the title position of Interlake Thrift. It is 
Southern Title against whom the appellants are seeking compensatio 
by means of the relief requested in their petition currently 
before this court. 
The primary thrust of the Perkins1 petition is that this 
court did not go far enough in its ruling, believing that the 
relief granted was sufficient. They claim that this court has 
failed to address the issue of the priorities that might result 
from the first subordination agreement if that agreement is either 
affirmed or overturned. This would seem to be in error by the 
Perkins. This court has apparently ruled on the issue of 
priorities revolving around the first subordination agreement. 
While no elaboration is apparently provided, this court did, on 
page 4 of its written opinion, state in one sentence that 
"appellants are bound by the first subordination agreement." This 
ruling conforms with the district court's ruling, and would 
clearly seem to uphold that judgment. 
While the court has not spoken at length on the reasoning 
for its ruling, the record is clear that such a ruling is 
appropriate in this action. It is abundantly clear from the 
undisputed facts that the Perkins had agreed from the outset, 
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in their Earnest Money Agreement, to subordinate their interest 
to the purchaser's lender, Interlake Thrift. What is erroneous 
by Perkins is that, following these undisputed facts, they 
argue at length why everyone else with any possible involvement 
in the transaction [involving the first subordination agreement] 
had a duty to see that the terms of the loan between Interlake 
and CIC complied with the subordination limits in the Earnest 
Money Agreement. Everyone, that is, except for the Perkins. 
They argue in their brief as to why, for various reasons, and 
based upon sundry arguments, they had absolutely no burden or 
obligation to inspect the various aspects of the closing that 
might impact upon their subordination agreement. In both their 
appeal brief and their Petition for Rehearing, they continue to 
shift the blame and responsibility to everyone else but themselves. 
This position is untenable. 
As stated in the facts in both the appellants' and 
respondent's briefs, and supported by the references therein to 
the record on appeal, the Perkins spent approximately one hour 
at the closing, with their realtor, along with the other parties 
involved, and at which time they had explained to them all of 
the various aspects of the closing that were known by the closing 
agent. The terms and ramifications of the subordination agreement 
were clearly explained to them. 
It would seem obvious that since the Perkins felt the 
limits of a loan between the buyer and the lender to which they 
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would be willing to subordinate were important enough to insert 
into the Earnest Money Agreement, they should have had some duty 
to inquire at the closing as to whether or not those terms had 
been complied with by the buyer. A prime case on this point is the 
of John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P2d 1205, 
at 1207-1208 (Utah, 1987), wherein the court ruled as follows: 
"Generally, one party to an agreement does not have a 
duty to ensure that the other party has a complete and 
accurate understanding of all terms embodied in a written 
contract. Rather, each party has the burden to read and 
understand the terms of a contract before he or she 
affixes his or her signature to it. A party may not sign a 
contract and thereafter assert ignorance or failure to 
read the contract as a defense. This rule is based upon 
the panoply of contract law upholding the principle that 
a party is bound by the contract which he or she voluntari] 
and knowingly signs. In this respect, this Court has 
emphasized: 
1
 Ignorance of the contents of an instrument does not 
ordinarily affect the liability of one who signs it. . . 
If a man acts negligently and in such a way as to 
justify others in supposing that the writing is assented 
to by him, he will be bound both at law and in equity, 
even though he supposes the instrument is an instrument 
of an entirely different character. . . . " [Citing 
Garff Realty Co. v. Better Bldgs., Inc., 234 P2d 842, 
844 (Utah, 1951.)] 
Furthermore, even if the Perkins had claimed in the 
court below a right to relief based upon unilateral mistaken, 
which they apparently did not, the Call Engineering case, supra., 
at 1209, held that such relief is available only if certain 
requirements are met, including, but not limited to, a required 
showing that " . . . the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding 
the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake. 
We submit that the Perkins did not use ordinary diligence, and 
their claim of ignorance simply cannot be allowed as an excuse 
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for being relieved under the first subordination agreement. 
They had a clear duty to see that the amount of the loan complied 
with the Earnest Money Agreement, and the fact that it did not is 
really no one's fault but their own. So, contrary to the 
lengthy discussion in the appellant's brief, the Perkins did 
have a duty to inquire. The district court, and this court as well 
in its opinion, were therefore well within the law, and the 
principles of justice and equity, in upholding the first subor-
dination agreement. We see no reason whatsoever for upsetting 
the court's ruling on this point. 
It is clear that the court's ruling went as far as it 
should. By ruling as it did, this court has placed the Perkins 
in a position that gives them appropriate priority among the various 
parties involved in ftie transaction. To sustain the Perkins1 
request would only serve to place innocent parties, who were not 
party to the sale of the property, including Southern, at jeopardy, 
all because of the failure of the Perkins to exercise due diligence 
at the time they executed the first subordination agreement. 
Southern Title insured the title based upon the record 
on the date the policy took effect. That policy reflected a second 
lien position for Perkins and a first for Interlake. This had 
been the intent of all parties involved from the outset, including 
the Perkins. Southern was an innocent party to the transaction 
between Perkins, Interlake and CIC (the buyer), and was insuring 
Interlake to its position and nothing more. Southern certainly 
had no obligation to inspect all of the documents on behalf of 
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any of the parties to ensure that everything was copacetic. 
Southern's agent was an agent solely for the purpose of issuing 
policies of insurance; not for conducting closings. But even if 
it were, the Perkins admit, as they have on page 5 of their 
petition, that ,f. . . the closing officer did not advise the 
Perkins of the deviation because he did not know." He had not beer 
supplied with any information that would have put him on notice 
that there was a problem or that would have put him in a position 
to advise the Perkins of any possible deviation from the Earnest 
Money Agreement. 
Perkins, in their Petition for Rehearing, on pages 5 and 
6, attempt to paint a picture of negligence on the part of the 
local title company and its underwriter, Southern Title. Not 
only does this not follow from the admitted facts, but it obviously 
raises a whole new issue on appeal which this court should not 
consider, or let it influence its opinion as to the other matters. 
It is therefore essential to recognize that the court's 
ruling in this matter went as far as it should. The Perkins 
are provided a priority position among the parties to the 
transaction by virtue of this court's ruling coupled with the 
satisfaction of the first note to Interlake. To go farther would 
only serve to jeopardize the positions and rights of innocent 
parties who have acted upon a situation largely created by the 
negligence and lack of due diligence of the Perkins. One final 
point should now be discussed, that being, even if this court were 
to rule that the Perkins had a priority position in the first 
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transaction, thus essentially vitiating the first subordination 
agreement, would that provide them any more relief than this court 
has already afforded them. We submit that it clearly would not. 
As a basis for granting the requested additional relief 
in this particular instance, we submit that Perkins should be 
required to show that there is a reasonable basis for obtaining 
satisfaction of their claims should this court grant their request 
and extend the ruling to provide that Perkins were in a first 
position in the first transaction. It is obvious, and Perkins 
say as much in their petition, that they somehow feel that if 
this court will grant them priority over Interlake as to the first 
subordination agreement, they are, ipso facto, entitled to recover 
from Southern Title. If they are not entitled to recover from 
Southern Title then the expense and trouble of additional proceedings 
in both this court and the district court would avail them nothing, 
and only result in a pointless expense and burden for a number 
of other parties. What then are their chances of being awarded 
relief against Southern Title. 
At the outset it goes virtually without saying that 
the Perkins are not entitled to recover from Southern any amounts 
due them from Interlake in the form of either attorney's fees or 
punitive damages. Thus, the only source of relief, which is the 
only basis that Southern is involved in this action in the first 
place, is by and through the policy of title insurance. Here 
any claim by Perkins must fail. 
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Only two possible approaches could be argued by Perkins th 
would even remotely place them in a position to make any claim 
upon Southern. First, they might argue that the Perkins are 
entitled to be subrogated to the position of Interlakef or in 
some other way place themselves in a position to claim that the 
policy inures to their benefit. 
It is a well recognized rule that policies of insurance 
are governed by the rules governing contracts generally. See, 
for example, Roscoe v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 526 P2d 
1080 (Utah, 1974); Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co of America, 
491 P2d 227 (Utah, 1971); Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. 
Co., 593 P2d 534 (Utah, 1979). 
With respect to this rule, it is well recognized that 
"the intention of the parties to, and the meaning of, a contract 
are deduced from the language and contents of the contract, and, 
where the terms are plain and unambiguous, the contract is 
conclusive." 17A C.J.S. Contracts, Sec. 291(1), p. 69. See also 
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 323 P2d 259 (Utah, 1958); Mathis v. 
Madsen, 261 P2d 952 (Utah, 1953); Plain City Irrigation Co. v. 
Hooper Irrigation Co., 356 P2d 625 (Utah, 1960). 
Given these basic facts there is no tenable theory upon 
which a claim can be made where the only named beneficiary in 
the insurance policy is Interlake, where there exists no privity 
between Southern and Perkins, and where there is no clear or implie 
attempt to create a third party beneficiary situation. 
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In the case of Capital America, Inc. v, Industrial Discounts, 
Inc., 383 So2d 936 (Fla., 1980), the owner of the subject property 
initially, BEC, mortgaged the property to a party by the name of 
White, and allegedly satisfied three earlier mortages to IDI. 
White's "first" mortgage was insured by Lawyers Title Guaranty 
Fund. Later BEC sold the property to Capital, who took it subject 
to the White mortgage. When the White mortgage became due, Capital 
paid it in full. Later it was discovered that the IDI mortgage 
satsifactions were forgeries and IDI foreclosed. 
Capital's crossclaim for recission against BEC was denied 
because of the intervening rights of White, an innocent party, 
and himself a subject of BEC's fraud. 
Capital further argued that it should be subrogated to 
White's rights under the title insurance policy. The court held, 
at p. 938, that: 
" . . . Capital America is not an assignee of the White 
mortgage and thus does not fit within the definition of 
an insured in the mortgagee policy. The mortgagee policy 
is an indemnity contract between White and Lawyers Title 
Guaranty Fund and there is no privity between appellant 
and Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund. Nor are there any of the 
elements of a third party beneficiary contract existent 
here. 
Finally, appellant had an opportunity to insure its title 
when it bought the property from B.E.C., Inc. subject only 
to the White mortgage. That it failed to do and we find 
no justifified compelling legal theory upon which appellant 
can now seek to impose liability upon Lawyers Title Guaranty 
Fund." 
We therefore submit that no avenue of relief is available to 
the Perkins from this theory. 
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The only other possible alternate source of relief for the 
Perkins would be to obtain an assignment of Interlake's beneficial 
interest in the insurance policy itself. This idea, however, is 
fraught with problems. By way of groundwork, it must first be 
stated that if an assignment were made it would be made subject 
to all existing equities and defenses between the assignor and 
the debtor existing at the time of the assignment. See Lynch v. 
MacDonald, 367 P2d 464, 469 (Utah, 1962); 6A C.J.-S. Assignments, 
Sec. 99. This has been held to extend to situations where "the 
assignment does not take the form of a transfer of a negotiable 
instrument, an assignee takes subject to all existing equities 
and defenses between the original parties, although he is a bona fj 
purchaser for value without notice of such equities or defenses." 
6A C.J.S. Assignments, Sec. 99, p. 757. See also Bank of Salt Lake 
v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 534 P2d 887 (Utah, 1981) . This has been held to 
also apply to the defense of fraud asserted against the assignor. 
See Lynch v. MacDonald, supra., at 469. This obviously then raises 
a number of problems. First, the insurance policy itself. Under 
"Exclusions from Coverage", paragraph 3 (Exhibit "A" to this brief) 
it provides "that the following matters are expressly excluded 
from the coverage of this policy: 3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, 
adverse claims or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or 
agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to the Company 
and not shown by the public records but known to the insured 
claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant 
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acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy . . . ." 
[Emphasis added] The District Court, as well as this court, have 
found fraud on the part of Interlake, and knowledge by Interlake 
of such fraud. This fraud obviously bears directly upon the rights 
and lien position of Interlake, and if known, obviously would have 
affected the issuance of a policy by Southern. Thus, given all else 
to Perkins, the fact that they have succeeded in establishing fraud 
by Interlake only serves to prevent any coverage under the policy. 
Next, and perhaps foremost, the entire issue of Southern 
Title's liability to Interlake under the subject title policy has 
already been fully litigated. Interlake's Third Party Complaint 
claims relief against Southern, in that not only is it requested 
that Southern defend the title, but they request judgment against 
Southern, among others, for any damages sustained as a result of 
any possible judgment that finds that the Perkins have a priority 
interest to that of Interlake. Eventually, all of these claims 
against Southern were reduced to one final judgment only for 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the action of Perkins against 
Interlake. That judgment has been fully paid and satisfied. The 
issue and claim is Res Judicata in all respects. The Perkins can 
make no claim against Southern under an assignment from Interlake. 
It is therefore pointless to require further proceedings on this 
issue since any theory by Perkins to claim monies from Southern 
Title can only meet with failure. 
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We also submit that in view of the fact that the first 
note, secured by the first position trust deed of Interlake, was 
satisfied as a result of the second transaction involving the 
second subordination agreement, any obligation of coverage by 
Southern is eliminated. There is no longer a position to insure. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Southern urges this court to deny the request 
for re-hearing and the relief petitioned for therein because the 
court has already ruled on a point which Perkins feel the court 
has not ruled, and that ruling is well supported by the law 
and the facts involved. In addition, no further relief should 
be granted because of the possible adverse effects such a ruling 
might have on Southern Title, which was an innocent party to the 
transaction involved. Furthermore, the Perkins should be denied 
any further relief unless they can show that such relief would 
produce some substantial, affirmative relief, as opposed to 
merely creating a great deal of additional litigation and expense 
for all parties involved. 
DATED this day of February, 19 89. 
BRANT H. WALL 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Southern Title Company 
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